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STATE OF UTAH

ELWOOD K. McFARLAND,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

)

APPELLANT SKAGGS ADDITIONAL
AUTHORITIES AND CORRECTIONS

)

SKAGGS, INC.,
)

Case No.

18352

Defendant/Appellant.
)

COMES NOW Appellant Skaggs pursuant to Rule 75(p)(3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits its Additional Authorities
and Corrections as follows:
I

1.

It is the position of Skaggs, and always has been, that its

privilege or justification to detain McFarland was two fold:
(a)

the shoplifting statutes which allow : a storeowner the

right to detain a customer for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner when the storeowner has reason to believe (probable
cause) that the customer has unlawfully taken merchandise from
the store without paying for it.·

(This was the basis on which

McFarland was initially approached).
.

(b)

I

the criminal statute (77-13-4) which allows any private

person the right to detain (arrest) another person "for a public
offense committed or attempted in his presence" when the private
person has reason to believe (probable cause) that the other
person has committed a public offense, which includes an assault,
in his presence, i.e. specifically, in this case, on her person.
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(This was an additional basis on which McFarland was detained).
2.

As soon as possible after McFarland was detained, Skaggs

called the police in order "to inform a peace officer of the detention
of the person and surrender th~t person to the custody of a peace
officer."

(76-6-603(5) When the peace officer arrived, he investiga-

ted both (a) the shoplifting charge and (b) the assault charge.
Thereafter, he advised Skaggs' security officer Avondet as follows:
Lucas;

"Are you really hurt?"
Avondet~
"Oh, not that bad. Just you know.
I've been hit and I'm not bleeding or
cut or anything."
Lucas;
"Well it's up to you. We have a good·
assault case.
It's'up to you~"·
(Record p. 59, 100)
2

Because Avondet was not hurt, she decided not to have McFarland
formally arrested for assault (and

thus~taken

before a magistrate)

and because the merchandise she had seen McFarland put in his pocket
could not be found, she decided not to have McFarland formally
arrested for shoplifting either, and thus it was decided that McFarland
should simply be released.
3.

The period of time that McFarland was detained was for both

the shoplifting charge and the assault charge.
other.

They overlapped each

Thus, if Skaggs was justified or privileged by law to detain

McFarland on either the shoplifting charge or the assault charge,
the dete_ntion was not unlawful. ·. . To say it another way, if Skaggs was
Q,

not justified or privileged to
charge, but Skaggs was

det~in

justi~ied

McFarland on the shoplifting

or privileged_ to detain McFarland

op the assault charge, then the detention was

~till

lawful because the

detention period for the assault charge overlapped and was the same
as the detention period for the sh?p~ifting charge.
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4.

Skaggs was not given a fair trial and the trial court

committed reversable and prejudicial error by instructing the jury
(Court's Instruction No. 12 and McFarland's Supplemental Request No.
2) that in order for Skaggs' detention

of McFarland on the assault

charge to be justified or privileged, Skaggs had to prove bexond a
reasonable doubt that McFarland would have been found guilty of the
crime of assault in a criminal court.

In addition, the Court

conrrnitted reversable and prejudicial error by instruc,ting the jury
(Court's Instruction No. 11 and McFarland's Supplemental·Request No.
1) that in Utah "there is no statutory privilege protecting against
an unlawful arrest for assault based on one having probable cause to
believe an assault had been committed."
5.

SkB;ggs objected to the Court's Instructions Nos 12 and 11;

among others, and requested Instructions that properly set forth the
j

burden of proof in this case, that being, proof by a preponderance
of the evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Skaggs'

Requested Instruction No. 1, attached hereto, stated that the burden
of proof was a preponderance of the evidence.
give this instruction as requested.

The Court did not

Skaggs' Requested Instruction

No. 2, attached hereto, defined the term "preponderance of the
evidence" and uprobable cause" and "reasonable belief".

The Court

did not give these Instructions as requested, but did in substance
(Court's Instructions Nos. 2 and 8).

Skaggs' Requested Instruction

Nos. 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11, attached hereto,
shoplifting.

stated the law concerning

The Court chose only to give Skaggs Requested Instruction

No. 11 (Court's Instruction No. 7).

Skaggs' Requested Instruction

Nos. 12 and 13 stated the law concerning assault.

The Court gave
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Skaggs' Instruction No. 12 (Court's Instruction No. 9) but added the
objectional second paragraph to its Instruction No. 11, to which
Skaggs objected, that "if an assault had not been committed, then she
had no right to arrest pla'intiff" and that ,-,there is no statutory
privilege protecting against an unlawful arrest for assault based

'

on one having probable cause to believe an assaulr had been committed."
The Court then instructed the jury in its Instruction No. 12 (McFarland's

Supp~emental

Request No. 2), over Skaggs'

objectio~

that

Skaggs had to prove the crime of assault by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or the arrest or detention for assault was unlawful.

Thus,

Skaggs did request the proper instructior13concerning preponderance
of the evidence, and what constitutes a lawful detention for shoplifting and assault, both of which are based on probable cause or
reasonable belief.
6.

The following corrections should be made to Appellant

Skaggs Brief on Appeal:
(a)

p. 7, cite is 78-11-7, not 78-17-7;

(b)

p. 13, cite in Lazarus v. Pascuzzi should be 393

N.E. 2d 1079 (Ill. 1979), not 333;
(c)

p. 14, cite should be 393 NE2d 1079, 1080, not 333

P.2d P.2d 1080;
(d)

p. 19, cite should be 4 U.L.R. 476, 477 not 486, 487;

(e)

p. 22, cite should be 404 A.2d 147, 153 footnote 16

(District of Columbia 1979), not excluding footnote.
Appellant Skaggs respectfully submits that this Court should
grant a new trial to Skaggs because the trial court committed reversable
and prejudicial error by imposing upon Skaggs in a civil trial the
obligation of proving its defense of justification or privilege to
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detain plaintiff by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e. a
criminal standard in a civil trial), instead of by a preponderance
of the evidence, and by advising the jury that Skaggs had no privilege
to detain plaintiff based on probable cause or a reasonable belief
I

~

that an assault had been committed, and thus the trial court made it
impossible for Skaggs to receive a fair trial.

In addition, it is

respectfully submitted that an award of punitive damages should be
based on. the facts and circumstances of each case, malice in fact,
and not implied by law, malice in law, as where there is an unlawful
detention or arrest-based on a good faith, honest mistake.
DATED this 14th day of November, 1983.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing

Appellant Skaggs' Additional Authorities and Corrections,

postage prepaid, to :
Findley P. Gridley
Bruce R. Baird
Attorneys for Plaintiff /Respondent
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah
84401
on ths 14th day of November, 1983~.
,,
,

,

'

);U_ JJ_,,1J ' -1 ln~. o,_,,j
Step en G. Morgan
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INSTRUCTION NO.

I-

Whenever in these instructions it is

st~ted

that the burden,

or the burden of proof, rests upon a certain party to prove a certain
allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction is this:
That unless the truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, you shall find that the same is not true.

If the

evidence is evenly balanced, as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

c2

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed with
that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth.
The existence of "probable cause," justifying an arrest without
a warrant, is determined by factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.

It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each

case in the light of the particular circumstances and the particular
offense involved.
Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case in
point of fact, as it may turn out upon legal investigation, but on
I

knowledge of facts and circumstances that would be sufficient to induce
a reasonable belief in the truth of the accusation.

It depends on the

facts known, at the time of the arrest, to the person by whom the arrest
is made, from which it follows that an arrest cannot be justified by
what a subsequent search discloses.

On the pther hand, if probable

cause existed at the time of the arrest, the fact that investigation
proves the person arrested to be innocent does not make the arrest
unjustifiable.
The term "reasonable belief" is used interchangeably with the
term "probable cause".
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INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that the law in the State of Utah is as
follows:

"78-11-17 . . Shoplifting-Authority to search.-Any mer~
chant may request any individual on his premises to place or
keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may
have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere,
whether for examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose. No merchant shall be criminally or civilly
liable on account of having made such a request."

"78-11-18. Shoplifting-Authority to detain.- Any
merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise has
been wrongfully taken by an individual and that he can
recover such merchandise by taking such individual into
custody and detaining him may, for ~he purpose of attempting
to effect such recovery or for the purpose of informing a
peace officer of the circumstances of such detention, take
the1individual into custody and detain him, on the premises,
in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time.
Such taking into custody and detention by a merchant or his
employee shall not render such merchant or his employee
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful detention or for any other
type of claim or action unless such taking into custody
and detention are unreasonable under all the circumstances."

"78-11-14.

Shoplifting-Definitions.-As used in this

act:
(3)
'Merchant' means an owner or operater of premises
in which merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale
and includes his employees, servants and agents.
(2)
'Merchandise' means any personal property displayed,
held or offered for sale by a merchant.
(5) "Wrongful taking of merchandise' means the taking
of merchandise that has not been purchased from a merchant's
premises without the permission of the merchant or one of
his employees, servants or agents."
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INSTRUCTION NO. (o
You are instructed that Ainta Avondet had a right to request
Plaintiff to place in full view any merchandise that he may have
removed, or which Anita Avondet had reason to believe he may have
removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose and you are
further instructed that Defendant Skaggs cannot be found civilly
liable to Plaintiff on account of Anita Avondet having made such
request.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

2-.

You are instructed that if Anita Avondet had reason to believe
that plaintiff had wrongfully taken merchandise then she had a right
to recover such merchandise by taking plaintiff into custody and
detai~ing

him for the purpose of attempting to effeGt such recovery

or for the purpose of informing a police officer of the circumstances
of such detention as long as she did so in a reasonable manner and
for a reasonable length of time and you are further instructed that
defendant Skaggs cannot be found civilly liable to plaintiff for
false arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful detention on
account of such taking into custody and detention unless such taking
into custody and detention was unreasonabie under all the circumstances.
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INSTRUCTION NO. /0
You are instructed that·. the law in the State of

Utah~

is as ..

follows:
"76-6-603. Detention of suspected violator by merchantPurposes .- Any merchant who has probable cause to believe
that a person has cormnitted retail theft may detain such
person, on or off the premises of a retal mercantile establishment, in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length
of time for all or any of the following purposes:
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person
has in his possession unpurchased merchandise and to make
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merch~ndise;
(2)

To request identification;

(3)

To verify such identification;

(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place
or keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have
rem9ved, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may have
removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose;
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the
person and surrender that person to the custody of a peace
officer·"
,

"76-6-604.

Defense to action by person detained.-In
any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful
detention, defamation of character, assault, trespass, or
invasion of civil rights brought by any person detained by
the merchant, it shall be a defense to such action that
the merchant detaining such person had probable cause to
believe that the person had committed retail theft and
that the merchant acted reasonably under all circumstances."

"76-6-604(4). 'Merchant' means an owner or operator
of any retail mercantile establishment where merchandise
is displayed, held or offered for sale and includes the
merchant's employees, servants or agents;
(3)
'Merchandise' means any personal property displayed,
held or offered for sale by a merchant;"
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INSTRUCTION NO. jJ_
You are instructed that if Anita Avondet had probable cause

.

to believe that Plaintiff had taken possession of, concealed, or
carried away merchandise displayed·· for sale with the intention-of
retaining such merchandise without paying for it, then she had a right
to detain Plaintiff on or off Skaggs premises in a reasonable manner
and for a reasonable length of time (1) to make reasonable inquiry
as to whether Plaintiff had in his possession unpurchased merchandise
and to make reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merchandise, (2) to request identification, (3) to verify

identific~tion,

(4) to make a reasonable request of Plaintiff to place in full view
-

such merchandise, and (5) to inform a peace officer of the detention
of

Plaint~ff

and surrender Plaintiff to the custody of a peace officer

and you are further instructed that under such circumstances Defendant
Skaggs cannot be found civilly liable to Plaintiff in an action for false
arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention, defamation of character,
assault, trespass, or invasion of civil

righ~s

as long as Anita Avondet

acted reasonably under all circumstances.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

/~

You are instructed that the law in the State of Utah is as
follows:
"76-5-102.

Assault.-(1)

Assualt is:

(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another; or
-·

(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of ilillilediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another."

"77-13-1. 'Arrest.' defined-By whom made.- An arrest
is the taking of a person into custody in a case and in ·the
manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace
officer or by a private person."

"77-13-2. How made-Restraint allowed.- An arrest .is
made by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant ... "
J

"77-13-4. By private persons.- A private person may
arrest another:
(1) For a public offense conrrnitted or attempted in
his presence."
An "assault" constitutes a "public offense."
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INSTRUCTION NO. ) r.-~
You are instructed that if .Plaintiff connnitted an assault
on Anita Avondet then she had a right to arrest Plaintiff and to
detain him for purposes of surrendering him to the custody of a
peace officer.
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